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ABSTRACT 
In 2014, Bahamian Prime Minister Perry Christie announced a constitutional referendum on 
gender equality. In 2002, his predecessor, Hubert Ingraham, had already put a similar referendum 
before the electorate. Back then, the proposed amendments failed. 
The Bahamas’ Independence Constitution imagines citizenship as limited and exclusionary. The 
amendments currently proposed would indeed remove some levels of discrimination contained in 
the citizenship provisions, but others would be retained, and some new ones may even be added. 
However, the discussion of these amendments is dominated by a proxy debate appealing to 
populist emotions. 
This paper seeks to analyse the amendments proposed in 2002, which marked the first attempt at 
constitutional reform since Bahamian Independence, as well as the process that ultimately led to 
defeat at the polls. The focus will be on the amendments addressing gender inequality. Questions 
include: how would the 2002 proposal have changed the levels of unequal access to citizenship 
compared to the 1973 Constitution, and how do they compare to the 2014 proposals? And, to 
what extent were there procedural flaws present in 2002, and to what extent did a distractionary 
discourse sabotage the declared goal of gender equality? 
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INTRODUCTION  
Since Independence in 1973, the Constitution 
of The Bahamas has seen only minor 
changes—cosmetic in nature, addressing non-
entrenched provisions (Constitutional 
Commission, 2013, p. 61) These have been 
disregarded; they certainly did not change the 
way Bahamians think and feel about this 
document, their nation, their democracy, or 
even themselves. However, attempts have 
been undertaken or at least processes begun, 
to make more fundamental changes to the 
Constitution. So far, none have succeeded. 
In 2002, towards the end of his second 
consecutive term in office, then Prime 
Minister Hubert Ingraham put five 
constitutional amendment bills to the 
electorate in the country’s first ever, and thus 
far only, constitutional referendum. All five 
were rejected at the polls on February 27, 
2002, gaining only between 29.1% and 37.2% 
of voter support (Dames, 2012). 
S. B. Aranha. Bahamian-ness as an Exclusive Good.   17 
The International Journal of Bahamian Studies Vol. 22 (2016) 
Following the failed referendum, Ingraham’s 
Free National Movement (FNM) also lost the 
May 2002 general election, and later that 
same year, the new Prime Minister Perry 
Christie, during his first term in office, 
appointed a constitutional commission co-
chaired by Paul Adderley and Harvey Tynes. 
This commission published two documents: 
The Bahamas Constitution: Options for 
Change (2003) and a Preliminary Report and 
Provisional Recommendations (2006). A 
second round of consultations was supposed 
to result in a final report, but the process got 
stalled and the Adderley-Tynes Commission 
never completed its work (Constitutional 
Commission, 2013, p. 60). In 2012, upon 
embarking on his second, non-consecutive 
term in office, Christie appointed a new 
constitutional commission chaired by Sean 
McWeeney,2 which submitted its report, 
Report of the Constitutional Commission into 
a Review of The Bahamas Constitution, on the 
eve of the 40th anniversary of Bahamian 
Independence in July 2013.  One year later, 
partly based on the recommendations of the 
McWeeney Commission, Christie announced 
a constitutional referendum originally 
scheduled for November 6, 2014. However, 
the announced referendum has since been 
postponed indefinitely3 with its four proposed 
constitutional amendment bills stuck in 
committee in the House of Assembly 
(Turnquest, 2015). 
The 2002 constitutional referendum consisted 
of five bills addressing a variety of unrelated 
subjects: gender equality, a Teaching Service 
Commission, the office of a Parliamentary 
Commissioner, the establishment of an 
independent Boundaries Commission, as well 
as the retirement age of judges. In contrast to 
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referred to as the McWeeney Commission. 
3 The Gender Equality Referendum was held June 
7, 2016, after this paper was accepted for 
publication. – Ed. 
this, the latest proposal, though consisting of 
four separate bills, is presented to the 
electorate under a single common theme: 
gender equality. The Christie administration 
thus revisits one of the subjects of the 2002 
exercise. Despite being presented in a 
markedly different format, the general thrust 
behind the bills is indeed similar to what it 
was then. This is important to note, because in 
2002 Christie, then Leader of the Opposition, 
campaigned for the defeat of the bills at the 
polls. 
While I will briefly describe the various 
constitutional amendment bills of 2002 in this 
paper, I will focus mainly on those that aimed 
to address the discrimination based on sex 
contained within the Constitution, particularly 
in its citizenship provisions. I will describe 
the various levels of inequality that currently 
exist, explain the changes a successful 
referendum in 2002 would have brought 
about, as well as the changes currently 
proposed in those instances where there are 
important differences between the 2002 and 
2014 proposals. I will also demonstrate that 
other levels of inequality and discrimination 
will continue to be enshrined in these 
constitutional provisions, even if the currently 
proposed amendments were successful, 
meaning they would have to pass both Houses 
of Parliament with the required qualified 
majority as well as being approved by a 
simple majority of voters in a constitutional 
referendum. 
Out of this comparison arise several 
questions. Why does Christie now attempt to 
realise the kind of constitutional reform that 
he was instrumental in defeating while in 
opposition? What lessons can be learnt from 
the failed attempt at constitutional reform in 
2002, in order to increase the chances of 
success in a future referendum aimed at 
decreasing the levels of discrimination 
enshrined in the Bahamian Constitution? 
What other developments since 2002 might 
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impact the outcome of a constitutional 
referendum, especially one on women’s 
rights, in today’s Bahamas? 
Proposed Constitutional Amendments, 
2002: An Analysis 
While the constitutional referendum in 2002 
saw only five questions put to the electorate, 
there were 10 bills seeking to amend the 
Constitution. One bill was withdrawn shortly 
before the referendum, and four bills were not 
put before the voters in the referendum. The 
argument, which has since been repeated by 
the McWeeney Commission, was that, 
technically, they did not need referendum 
approval (Constitutional Commission, 2013, 
p. 240). I posit that this, in some instances at 
least, is a loose interpretation of the spirit of 
both article 54 of the Constitution, as well as 
of the Constitutional Referendum Act, which 
requires that for any bill which “seeks to alter 
an Article of the Constitution specified in 
Article 54(2) or (3) of the Constitution … a 
vote shall be taken by way of a referendum 
...” (Constitutional Referendum Act, 1977, 
sec. 2(1).). 
The bills for which no referendum approval 
was sought were Bills 2, 3, 4 and 5. At least 
Bills 2 and 5 addressed areas that were 
already entrenched in the Constitution. 
However, instead of altering existing articles, 
they proposed to create new articles without 
referendum approval, only to then have these 
entrenched via referendum, meaning that any 
future changes to these new articles created 
without a referendum would then require one. 
With Bill 10, which would have introduced a 
five-year waiting period before being eligible 
to apply for spousal citizenship but granting 
foreign spouses of Bahamians a residency and 
work permit in the interim, withdrawn, this 
left Bills 1, 6, 7, 8 and 9 going to referendum. 
Bill 2 sought to establish the office of 
Parliamentary Commissioner “to keep the 
register of voters and to carry out duties 
relating to registration of voters and the 
holding of elections” (Bahamas Constitution 
(Amend.) (No. 2) Act, 2002, p. 4). This was 
to be done in articles 70A, 70B and 70C of 
the Constitution, which were defined as new 
articles, rather than as amendments to the 
existing article 70, thus circumventing the 
constitutional provision in article 54 that 
would have made a referendum on this Bill a 
requirement. However, Bill 7, which did go to 
referendum, then sought to entrench these 
new articles into the Constitution by 
amending article 54 accordingly. Therefore, 
this part of the 2002 referendum was not 
about the creation of the office of 
Parliamentary Commissioner, but merely 
about its entrenchment after the fact. 
Bills 3 and 4 sought to establish the office of 
Director of Public Prosecutions, and define its 
role, by adding new articles 92A, 92B and 
92C (Bahamas Constitution (Amend.) (No. 4) 
Act, 2002), and consequently to redefine the 
functions of the Attorney-General by 
changing article 78 (Bahamas Constitution 
(Amend.) (No. 3) Act, 2002). As neither 
article 78 nor article 92 is entrenched in 
article 54, and as no entrenchment of the new 
articles was sought, neither of these two bills 
went to referendum. However, due to the 
overall failure of the constitutional reform 
effort, none of these new articles has yet 
become part of the Constitution, as “no day 
was appointed for these acts to come into 
operation” (Constitutional Commission, 2013, 
p. 240). 
Bill 5 sought to establish a Teaching Service 
Commission by adding new articles 121A, 
121B and 121C to the Constitution. The 
Commission’s purpose would have been to 
advise the Governor-General “to appoint 
persons to hold or act in public offices in the 
Teaching Service and to remove and to 
exercise disciplinary control over persons 
holding or acting in such offices…” (Bahamas 
Constitution (Amend.) (No. 5) Act, 2002). 
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Bill 6 then sought to entrench these new 
articles into article 54 of the Constitution; the 
current article 121 is already entrenched. As 
in the case of the office of Parliamentary 
Commissioner, this then would not have been 
a consultation of the electorate about the 
establishment of the Commission, but merely 
about its entrenchment after the fact. In 
addition, Bill 6 would have added a mention 
of this new Commission in the entrenched 
article 107: 
A former member of the Public Service 
Commission or Teaching Service 
Commission shall not, within a period of 
five years commencing with the date on 
which he last held or acted in that office, 
be eligible for appointment to any office 
power to make appointments to which is 
vested by this Constitution in the 
Governor-General acting on the 
recommendation or in accordance with 
the advice of the Public Service 
Commission. (Bahamas Independence 
Order, 1973, art. 107; Bahamas 
Constitution (Amend.) (No. 6) Act, 2002) 
This would have excluded Teaching Service 
Commission members from appointments 
made by the Public Service Commission, but 
not from appointments made by the Teaching 
Service Commission itself—a noteworthy 
construct. 
Bill 8 sought to establish a new Boundaries 
Commission to replace the existing 
Constituencies Commission, by changing the 
entrenched article 69 of the Constitution. The 
referendum ballot question characterised this 
new commission as independent; however, all 
of its members would have continued to be 
political appointees: 
The Chairman and one other member of 
the Commission shall be appointed by the 
Governor-General, acting on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister 
after consultation with the Leader of the 
Opposition, … and the Deputy Chairman 
and one other member shall be appointed 
by the Governor-General, acting on the 
recommendation of the Leader of the 
Opposition after consultation with the 
Prime Minister… (Bahamas Constitution 
(Amend.) (No. 8) Act, 2002). 
The fifth member would have been the 
Parliamentary Commissioner, also “appointed 
by the Governor-General acting on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister after 
consultation with the Leader of the 
Opposition” (Bahamas Constitution (Amend.) 
(No. 2) Act, 2002). However, as the 
Parliamentary Commissioner was to be 
tenured for a period of eight years (Bahamas 
Constitution (Amend.) (No. 2) Act, 2002), it 
is conceivable that the government of the day 
would not necessarily have appointed the 
majority of the Commission’s members—an 
important difference in comparison to the 
composition of the current Constituencies 
Commission. 
Finally, Bill 9 sought to increase the 
retirement age of Supreme Court Justices 
from 65 years to 68 years of age, and possible 
extensions from 67 to 72 years by changing 
the entrenched articles 96 and 102 of the 
Constitution by way of referendum (Bahamas 
Constitution (Amend.) (No. 9) Act, 2002). 
This completes the brief overview of what 
might be considered the “simpler” bills, each 
changing no more than a few constitutional 
provisions, and all addressing topics that have 
not seriously resurfaced in public discourse. It 
must be noted that in the above instances, 
many of the bills were constructed, by 
definition, as adding new articles to the 
Constitution rather than changing its existing 
articles to circumvent the need for a 
referendum on them. Namely, these were 
articles 70A, 70B, 70C, 92A, 92B, 92C, 
121A, 121B, and 121C. As we shall see 
below, Bill 1, on the other hand, was 
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inconsistent with this dialectic. 
Whereas none of the above bills were very 
complex, Bill 1 proposed to change no fewer 
than nine articles in the Constitution, namely 
articles 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 26, and finally 
54, which entrenches the previous eight 
articles. These articles of the Constitution not 
only govern citizenship but also spell out the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individual. In the still operational 
Independence Constitution of 1973, these 
provisions are unequal for men and women. 
In the Constitution, article 3 defines those 
persons who became citizens upon 
Independence on July 10, 1973. In its current 
form, paragraph 2 grants citizenship to those 
overseas-born children whose fathers became 
“or would but for his death have become” 
(Bahamas Independence Order, 1973, art. 3)4 
citizens of The Bahamas. Article 3(2) thus 
clearly discriminates against Bahamian 
mothers—or the children of these Bahamian 
mothers. In combination with article 14, 
however, the nature of this discrimination is 
no longer as unidirectional, for article 14 
invokes the common law principle of filius 
nullius, declaring the biological father 
irrelevant when determining the status of 
children born out of wedlock (Constitutional 
Commission, 2013, p. 104). This then means 
that article 3(2) denies citizenship to children 
born overseas prior to Independence to either 
a married woman, who became a Bahamian 
citizen upon Independence, and her foreign 
husband, or an unmarried man, who became a 
Bahamian citizen upon Independence, and a 
foreign mother. The 2002 proposal would 
have removed this bias, by changing the 
language from “father” to “father or mother” 
(Bahamas Constitution (Amend.) Act, 2002). 
The bill was proposed to be retroactive, thus 
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granting citizenship to a group of children 
who up to this point have no constitutional 
entitlement to Bahamian citizenship. As the 
bill also proposed to remove the marriage-bias 
by revoking filius nullius in article 14, it 
would have addressed both instances of 
inequality. 
Article 8 is similar to article 3(2) in that it 
addresses the access to citizenship of 
overseas-born children, but post-
independence. Again, the 1973 Constitution 
grants it to the children of Bahamian fathers; 
again, because of the filius nullius rule in 
article 14, this then means the overseas-born 
children of married Bahamian men or 
unmarried Bahamian mothers. Again, the 
proposed change was to remove the gender 
bias—and in connection with the proposed 
changes to article 14, marriage bias—and 
grant the same constitutional entitlement to 
citizenship to the overseas-born children of 
most Bahamian parents. This change, too, 
would have been retroactive, allowing 
children to become citizens upon the 
commencement of the change, even if they 
were born prior to the change. It is, however, 
important to note that there still remains a 
group of Bahamian parents—men or women, 
married or unmarried—excluded from passing 
on their citizenship to their overseas-born 
children, and that is those who obtained their 
citizenship either through article 3(2) or 8 
themselves, that is, they were themselves 
overseas-born. 
The proposed 2002 amendments to articles 3 
and 8 also emphasised that they would not 
have affected the entitlement of anybody to 
citizenship under any earlier provisions of the 
Constitution that have been changed. This is 
important, as the change to article 9 would 
have been a drastic one: it was proposed that 
it be deleted. 
Article 9 currently entitles the overseas-born 
children of Bahamian mothers married to 
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foreign husbands to be registered as citizens 
upon reaching the age of 18 years, and while 
the new article 8 would have been retroactive, 
there remains one group of children currently 
entitled to future citizenship, but still waiting 
to claim it under article 9, who would not be 
entitled to it under the new article 8. Currently 
the overseas-born children of married 
Bahamian fathers and unmarried Bahamian 
mothers who were themselves born overseas 
are excluded from citizenship, but article 9 
does not define the same exclusions for 
married Bahamian women. However, these 
children have to wait until they turn 18 before 
they can apply, and they must do so before 
turning 21. Without saving this constitutional 
entitlement under article 9 for those born 
before the change, some children would have 
been, figuratively speaking, deleted from the 
waitlist. 
Article 5 speaks to spousal citizenship upon 
Independence. It entitles not only foreign 
wives, but also foreign ex-wives and widows 
of husbands who became Bahamian citizens 
upon Independence, to also become Bahamian 
citizens upon Independence. Here, too, the 
2002 proposal sought to remove the gender 
bias by allowing the foreign husbands—and 
ex-husbands and widowers—of wives who 
became Bahamian citizens upon 
Independence these same rights. It is 
important to note that this article applies only 
to marriages entered into prior to 
Independence, so that this, too, would have 
been a retroactive change (Bahamas 
Constitution (Amend.) Act, 2002). 
Similarly, article 10 speaks to spousal 
citizenship post-independence. It currently 
entitles the foreign wives of Bahamian 
husbands to be registered as citizens. The 
main difference to article 5 is that in this case, 
the marriage must persist; ex-wives and 
widows are not so entitled. Here, too, the 
gender bias would have been removed for the 
current foreign husbands who got married to 
their Bahamian wives on or after July 10, 
1973. 
Apart from the various clauses defining how 
Bahamian citizenship is obtained, this chapter 
of the Constitution also addresses the possible 
deprivation of such citizenship. Currently 
Parliament may make laws to revoke the 
citizenship of Bahamian citizens, except that 
of those who are citizens by virtue of articles 
6 or 8 of the Constitution, that is citizens born 
after Independence and entitled to citizenship 
at birth (Bahamas Independence Order, 1973, 
art. 13(b).). This group’s citizenship cannot be 
revoked, except in very limited cases where 
the Governor-General has the discretionary 
right to deprive some Bahamians who are dual 
nationals of their citizenship (Bahamas 
Independence Order, 1973, art. 11). It was 
proposed to add citizens by virtue of the 
newly amended article 3A to this protected 
list (Bahamas Constitution (Amend.) Act, 
2002), that is, citizens born overseas prior to 
Independence to parents who were entitled to 
Bahamian citizenship at Independence. Yet 
citizens born in The Bahamas prior to 
Independence would not have been amongst 
the beneficiaries of this constitutional change. 
In essence, this starkly contrasts with the post-
independence preference for ius soli, putting 
those born prior to Independence within The 
Bahamas in a less privileged position than 
those born abroad. 
The proposed change to article 13 was the 
only provision in this complex bill that did 
not aim to address some form of gender 
disparity in the current Constitution. It did not 
address any other form of discrimination 
either; rather it further expanded the 
Constitution’s catalogue of differences. 
However, the article’s highly discriminatory 
nature—it effectively creates “two legal 
classes of citizens” (Johnson, 2008, p. 60)—
so far has not been a topic in any discussion 
about constitutional reform. 
22   S. B. Aranha. Bahamian-ness as an Exclusive Good.   
The International Journal of Bahamian Studies Vol. 22 (2016) 
Thus far, Bill 1 addressed the chapter on 
citizenship, but its last provision proposed a 
change to article 26, which defines 
discrimination in the chapter on fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the individual as 
follows:  
In this Article, the expression 
‘discriminatory’ means affording 
different treatment to different person 
[sic] attributable wholly or mainly to their 
respective descriptions by race, place of 
origin, political opinions, colour or creed 
whereby person [sic] of one such 
description are subjected to disabilities or 
restrictions to which person [sic] of 
another such description are not made 
subject or are accorded privileges or 
advantages which are not accorded to 
persons of another such description 
(Bahamas Independence Order, 1973, art. 
26(3).). 
The proposed change was to add the word 
“gender” to the above list of attributes 
(Bahamas Constitution (Amend.) Act, 2002). 
Proposed Constitutional Amendments, 
2002 and 2014: A Comparison 
While all of the above proposals failed to find 
the approval of voters in the 2002 referendum, 
12 years later, in the summer of 2014, Christie 
tabled a set of four constitutional amendment 
bills in the House of Assembly, which in their 
combination had a similar thrust to Bill 1 of 
2002. This time, it was declared, the 
referendum would address only one aspect of 
constitutional reform: the removal of gender 
discrimination (“PM Opens,” 2014). Only, the 
first victim of this renewed attempt was the 
term “gender”, which is not included in the 
actual bills. Instead, it has been replaced by 
the narrower concept and the strictly 
biologically understood word, “sex” 
(Bahamas Constitution (Amend.) Bill (No. 4), 
2014). This was a recommendation of the 
McWeeney Commission’s report, but the 
reasons for this choice of word were not 
discussed within its pages. Even though the 
report’s discussion revolved wholly around 
the term “gender”, it is the word “sex” that 
then appears in the specific recommendation 
for amending article 26 (Constitutional 
Commission, 2013, p. 23). 
The McWeeney Commission further 
recommended adding a provision to article 26 
explicitly stating that despite the broadened 
anti-discrimination criteria, laws prohibiting 
same-sex marriage shall not be inconsistent 
with the Constitution (Constitutional 
Commission, 2013, p. 25). This 
recommendation was not included in the 
proposed bills. Both the administration and 
the same Commission, which is now tasked 
with educating the Bahamian electorate about 
the four bills, can argue that the Constitution 
already exempts marriage laws from having to 
comply with the anti-discrimination 
provisions (Bahamas Independence Order, 
1973, art. 26(4)(e).). As it stands, the 19th 
century Matrimonial Causes Act prohibits 
same-sex marriage: “A marriage shall be void 
on any of the following grounds: ... that the 
parties are not respectively male and 
female...” (Matrimonial Causes Act (1879), 
sec. 21(1)(c).). The proposed constitutional 
change would therefore not void this law. 
Furthermore, the Constitution exempts laws 
“enacted or made before” Independence from 
having to comply with the Constitution’s non-
discrimination clauses (Bahamas 
Independence Order, 1973, art. 30(1)(a).). 
While many opponents of the current 
constitutional reform effort have tried to 
derail the process by proclaiming that the 
Christie administration’s ulterior motive was 
to sneak in same-sex marriage under the guise 
of equality between men and women, this 
argument neglects not only the constitutional 
reality outlined above, but also ignores the 
fact that Parliament could legalise such today 
without the need for a controversial, costly 
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and politically perilous referendum. 
The proxy discussion over same-sex marriage 
to defeat the constitutional guarantee of 
gender equality is probably owed, at least in 
part, to developments abroad as well as to the 
influence that international media covering 
them have in The Bahamas (Aranha, 2014). 
However, the attempts at mitigating these 
fears among many Bahamians did little to 
achieve that aim. Rather, through the 
McWeeney Commission’s patient entertaining 
of the issue at town hall meetings, as well as 
through Christie’s reference to it when first 
presenting the four bills in July 2014 (“PM 
Opens,” 2014), an impression is created that 
those fears are perhaps justified, even though 
Christie presumably made the reference to 
preemptively alleviate such concerns. 
Another major difference between the 2002 
proposals and the current proposals is the 
retroactivity of the new citizenship provisions. 
It is no longer a part of the plan. During town 
hall meetings, retired Justice Rubie Nottage 
(personal communication, August 5, 2014) 
has argued on behalf of the Commission’s 
education campaign that this is due to the fact 
that the government simply does not know 
how many people would suddenly be entitled 
to citizenship—a move deemed too risky. 
However, it stands to reason that statisticians 
should be able to extrapolate a fairly accurate 
estimate of that number based on data 
available to the government, such as overseas 
passport applications, demographic data for 
the countries from which they were made, 
historical figures of applications for 
citizenship registration under article 9, etc. 
Overall, the 2002 Bill 1 would have been 
more comprehensive and less exclusionary 
than the four 2014 bills combined (Aranha, 
2015). The McWeeney Commission recorded 
observers opining that this complexity of the 
2002 bills as well as the government’s failure 
to adequately educate the electorate about 
them had contributed to the failed referendum 
(Constitutional Commission, 2013, p. 63). If 
that is one reason for the different approach of 
dividing the gender equality issue into several 
bills, Nottage, at town hall meetings, gave 
another reason: the McWeeney Commission 
and the Christie administration are of the 
opinion that one constitutional amendment 
bill may not change more than one article of 
the Constitution (personal communication, 
August 5, 2014). This is an interpretation of 
the Constitution that is implicit, not explicit 
(Bahamas Independence Order, 1973, art. 54). 
However, as a consequence this amounts to an 
indirect accusation that the 2002 process was 
unconstitutional; if upheld, it would also cast 
doubt upon the constitutionality of one of the 
current proposals, for the first Constitutional 
Amendment Bill (2014) affects both articles 8 
and 9 of the Constitution. While the 2002 
process was indeed criticised by the 
opposition, this criticism did not claim 
unconstitutionality of the bills themselves. 
The opposition did try to claim 
unconstitutionality of the process, arguing that 
the referendum date of February 27, 2002 was 
too close to that of the upcoming general 
election, ultimately held on May 2, 2002. 
However, their argument in this regard failed 
to gain traction (Smith, R. M., 2002, p. 1). 
Christie’s main criticism of the 2002 process 
can be described as what he deemed a lack of 
appropriate consultations with those he 
considered legitimate stakeholders—
predominantly, the churches (Thompson, 
2012). 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the 
complexity of the 2002 bills, their ballot 
questions, which are a required element of 
each bill (Constitutional Referendum Act , 
1977, sec. 3), were more accurate than the 
current proposals, where especially the first 
bill’s ballot question would be misleading if it 
were to remain unchanged, as it does not  
acknowledge the existence of disqualifiers 
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that exclude parents from passing on their 
citizenship and instead leads the audience to 
believe that there exists a positive list of 
qualifiers that would enable them to do so; the 
language suggests that this right would be the 
privilege of those parents who are citizens by 
birth (Rolle-Brown, 2014). Yet while some of 
the excluded categories, i.e. articles 3(2) and 8 
of the Constitution, do in fact describe 
citizens by birth, others who are not citizens 
by birth but by registration or naturalisation 
are not excluded. 
Three other differences highlight the more 
exclusionary nature of the current proposals: 
while 2002 simply removed the gender bias 
from the entitlement of overseas-born children 
of Bahamian parents, spousal citizenship and 
filius nullius, Christie now introduced new 
supposed safeguards to ensure that Bahamian 
citizenship remains an exclusive good—in the 
first instance by expanding the list of 
disqualifiers contained in article 8 (Bahamas 
Constitution (Amend.) Bill, 2014), in the 
second instance by erecting perceived 
protections against so-called marriages of 
convenience, and in the third instance by 
making DNA testing of unmarried fathers 
mandatory thereby continuing a degree of 
discrimination based on marital status, for 
while the married man is automatically 
assumed to be his wife’s child’s father, the 
unmarried couple’s word is not trustworthy 
enough to establish paternity (Bahamas 
Constitution (Amend.) Bill (No. 2), 2014). 
However, it must be remembered that the 
withdrawn Bill 10 of 2002 also would have 
put somewhat stricter requirements on spousal 
citizenship, which could be interpreted as an 
early attempt to protect against so-called 
marriages of convenience without saying so in 
the actual text. 
Those are the obvious differences. There are 
obvious commonalities, too. Bill 1 (2002) and 
Bills 1 through 4 (2014) appear to share the 
theme of gender equality. However, most 
obvious are some shortcomings of both 
proposals. 
Firstly, because of the exclusionary nature of 
the citizenship provisions in articles 3(2) and 
8 of the Constitution, the reality is now, 
would have remained in 2002, and will 
remain even if the current exercise were to 
succeed, that the overseas-born children even 
of two Bahamian parents could be rendered 
stateless if they are born in a country that does 
not have ius soli. Due to their more 
exclusionary character, the current proposals 
increase this risk, despite the McWeeney 
Commission’s recommendation to remove all 
disqualifiers from article 8 in order to ensure 
that the children of all Bahamian citizens, not 
only regardless of their parents’ sex but 
regardless of their parents’ place of birth, 
enjoy the same rights (Constitutional 
Commission, 2013, p. 104). 
Secondly, both in 2002 and now, the 
government avoids the proverbial elephant in 
the room—the need to revisit article 7 of the 
Constitution, which speaks to children born in 
The Bahamas after independence to two non-
Bahamian parents, or an unmarried non-
Bahamian mother and Bahamian father. 
Currently, they are “entitled, upon making 
application on his [sic] attaining the age of 
eighteen years or within twelve months 
thereafter in such manner as may be 
prescribed, to be registered as a citizen of The 
Bahamas...” (Bahamas Independence Order, 
1973, art. 7) or, in short, “entitled… to be 
registered as a citizen.” This is frequently 
obfuscated by reducing it to being merely a 
“right to apply,” even by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Immigration Fred 
Mitchell (2015), especially in the public 
debate around the government’s so-called 
New Immigration Policy. The reality is that 
many of these children are here to stay, and 
that our Constitution’s rendering them 
stateless, whether de jure or de facto, as 
minors, and due to the slow processing of 
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applications by the Department of 
Immigration and cabinet as young adults, too, 
disadvantages them as individuals and as 
members of our society. This then can create 
parallel societies, ultimately harming the very 
society this exclusivity was designed to 
protect. After reviewing the Constitution in its 
entirety and making countless recom-
mendations on virtually all aspects of the 
document, the McWeeney Commission 
decided to exclude article 7 from its review, 
and instead recommended the appointment of 
another commission to further study this 
subject (Constitutional Commission, 2013, 
pp. 103-104). While Christie announced in 
2014 that “preliminary preparations are 
already underway” (“PM Opens,” 2014) to 
this end, no such commission has been 
appointed as yet. 
The riskiest difference contained in the 
current proposals, however, is the presentation 
of separate bills in what will be a binding 
referendum. In a worst-case scenario, this 
could result in increasing rather than 
decreasing the inequality between fathers and 
mothers. Namely, if Bill 1 (2014) were to fail 
but Bill 3 (2014) were to succeed, filius 
nullius would be abolished, and unmarried 
Bahamian fathers would gain the right to pass 
on Bahamian citizenship to their children 
while unmarried Bahamian mothers would 
consequently lose the right to pass on 
Bahamian citizenship to their children born 
overseas. 
Resistance to Reform: 
Recommendations to Avoid a Repeat 
Performance 
While voters in 2002 were asked to decide on 
an array of issues, Bill 1 and its promise of 
gender equality, as well as its resounding 
rejection in the referendum is the one 
Bahamians seem to remember most vividly 
today. It certainly generated the most debate 
then (Bethel, 2003, p. 72). Given Bahamian 
voters’ demographics, it stands to reason that 
the referendum was not, or at least not only, a 
vote on the issues at hand. Both the 2000 as 
well as the 2010 census show that Bahamian 
women outnumber Bahamian men by 
approximately 52% to 48% in the overall 
population of the country (Bahamas Dept. of 
Statistics, 2002, 2012). Among the adult 
population, i.e. those eligible to vote, this 
imbalance is slightly greater still. Before the 
last general election, Ingraham announced that 
there were approximately 20,000 more 
women registered to vote than men (Hall, 
2012). Given the total registration numbers 
for 2012, that translates into a split of roughly 
56% women to 44% men amongst registered 
voters.5 
If the majority of voters are women, why then 
is a vote for equal rights controversial? The 
McWeeney Commission mentioned several 
factors as contributing to the failed 
referendum in 2002: “contamination of the 
referendum by other political controversies; 
the imminence of a general election; 
decidedly mixed feelings among the electorate 
as to the citizenship-related aspects of the 
gender-equality issue; the complexity of the 
bills; and the lack of public education” 
(Constitutional Commission, 2013, p. 63). 
However, these are in many ways connected, 
rather than separate reasons. 
When the People’s Liberal Party (PLP), after 
having voted for all of the constitutional 
amendment bills in the House of Assembly, 
turned around, withdrew its support, and 
campaigned against the amendments, it 
became a political issue. This in turn affected 
everything down to the public’s education 
about the bills. 
Arguably, Ingraham and the FNM 
                                                          
5 Calculation based of Ingraham’s statement and 
voter registration numbers published by the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, 
http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=31 
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underestimated the need for an educational 
campaign, too, only announcing it less than 
four weeks before the referendum (Smith, 
February 1, 2002, p. 11). A few days later, the 
divided political climate on the issue led him 
to decide that no funds from the public 
treasury would be spent on such a campaign, 
but that, because the PLP was using its party 
funds for a No campaign, the FNM would use 
its party funds for a Yes campaign; 
government funds were to be “limited to 
reproducing the bills, printing posters, and 
costs associated with sponsoring the 
referendum” (Smith, February 11, 2002, p. 1). 
The unfortunate result of this decision was 
that the education on the constitutional 
amendment process then took place at party 
rallies (Smith, February 26, 2002. p. 1). 
However, political rallies in The Bahamas are 
neither informational nor educational, but 
largely emotional, and they each tend to reach 
only one side of the political divide. Thus, at a 
rally less than a week before the referendum, 
Ingraham made the ultimate plea: “Whoever 
wins Wednesday’s referendum will no doubt 
become the next government of The Bahamas. 
If you give us the referendum I will give you 
the next government of The Bahamas” 
(Maycock, 2002). 
An analysis of the media coverage of the 2002 
referendum suggests that the highly 
politicised nature of the referendum, and the 
unpopularity of the sitting government early 
in 2002 when The Bahamas’ tourism sector 
was suffering badly as a result of the 9/11 
terror attacks in the United States, were the 
main reasons for the No vote. I furthermore 
posit that the opposition PLP exploited this 
climate, and the referendum, for the ultimate 
prize, i.e. the May 2nd general election. 
When Christie introduced his bills in 2014, 
much of the process had already been 
markedly different from the 2002 process, e.g. 
the McWeeney Commission had met with 
more than a dozen clergy from different 
denominations, and their opinions had been 
noted in the Constitutional Commission report 
(2013, App. VI). Also, a public education 
campaign was launched and announced with 
their tabling in Parliament (“PM Opens,” 
2014). It could be argued that this was 
premature, as the bills are, to this date, stuck 
in committee in the House of Assembly. This 
means that they are subject to further changes 
that could have potential implications for any 
informational or educational campaign. 
However, an educational campaign alone may 
not be sufficient to ensure that the bills pass in 
another referendum. The process faces several 
serious challenges. Parallel to what happened 
in 2002, the current process is in danger of 
being politicised. Not only does the FNM 
expect Christie to apologise for campaigning 
against the 2002 referendum (Thompson, 
2014), but Christie categorically refuses to do 
so (Virgil, 2014). In the current political 
climate, with the sitting PLP government’s 
unpopularity arguably rivalling that of the 
2002 FNM administration, but the FNM 
opposition being perceived as “the weakest 
the country has seen in decades” (Cartwright-
Carroll, 2016), any effort the electorate 
perceives to be part of Christie’s effort to 
construct his own legacy, and thus a 
popularity contest, runs the risk of being 
rejected. On the other hand, the opposition 
may jump at any opportunity to sharpen its 
profile. 
Prominent members affiliated with both major 
political parties are spearheading the 
educational campaign but it nonetheless faces 
some challenges. By relying heavily on the 
town hall format, it has, at least thus far, 
embraced a decidedly 20th-century approach 
to public campaigning. Also, it has largely 
been on the defensive. Christie himself 
brought up same-sex marriage in connection 
with the constitutional amendment bills, as if 
in an attempt to alleviate concerns before they 
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could be voiced (“PM Opens,” 2014). Since 
then, the McWeeney Commission has been 
patiently entertaining many questions on the 
subject at repeated town hall meetings. 
Arguably, it could have taken a stronger 
stance in categorically dismissing the matter. 
As a result, homophobia appears to have been, 
to some extent, validated in the debate, if only 
serving as a proxy for misogyny. 
In their analysis of the public debate of the 
proposed marital rape law in 2009, Lisa 
Benjamin and Cathleen LeGrand 
demonstrated that “unfounded beliefs, 
unchallenged assumptions and illogical 
arguments” (2012, p. 31) can effectively 
derail legislative reform. This debate also 
showed a continued strong element of 
misogyny among shapers of Bahamian public 
opinion, which does not bode well for a 
referendum on gender equality, even if, for the 
time being, the disguises of choice are 
homophobia and chauvinism. 
Another obstacle to a successful constitutional 
referendum is the tainted legacy of the so-
called referendum on web-shop gaming and a 
national lottery, which was held in January 
2013. Voter turnout was well below 50% 
(Hainey, 2013) and the government could thus 
argue that no quorum had been reached and 
that the gaming referendum in reality was but 
a non-binding opinion poll in which the 
majority of the electorate, by abstaining, 
declared they had no preference either way. 
Christie prepared for such a scenario before 
the vote and declared “that a minority turnout 
would make the result ‘inconsequential’ and 
the government would have to make its own 
judgement on the way forward” (Smith, 
2013). Nonetheless, after the vote he 
promised that he would abide by the outcome 
(Thompson, 2013). However, his 
administration has since turned around, and 
passed legislation to legalise and regulate 
web-shop gaming regardless (Gaming Act, 
2014). His administration has since failed to 
make the Bahamian public understand and 
trust that, in contrast to the so-called 
referendum in 2013, a constitutional 
referendum will be binding, that his 
administration not only would not, but could 
not, act contrary to its outcome. 
If, because of the history of the past 14 years, 
the process, the actors as well as the bills are 
contaminated, then what measures might 
increase the chances of gender equality 
becoming entrenched in the Bahamian 
Constitution? One possible approach would 
be to broaden the conversation about the 
current proposals. As most of the 
constitutional provisions requiring change 
affect the Constitution’s chapter on 
citizenship, especially the status of children 
born to Bahamian parents abroad, the public 
debate would gain an element of honesty if 
the proponents of change admitted more 
directly that, yes, the changes would have 
immigration implications. Also, framing the 
entire conversation around the very worthy 
concept of gender equality neglects to 
acknowledge one fundamental fact: the 
citizenship provisions only indirectly 
discriminate against Bahamian women—and 
some Bahamian men—in their roles as 
parents. The real victims of this unequal 
entitlement to Bahamian citizenship, however, 
are their children, regardless of their sex. The 
key provision in the Constitution, where the 
debate is framed around gender, but could 
also be framed around children’s rights, is 
article 8, which says, “A persons [sic] born 
outside of The Bahamas … shall become a 
citizen … if … his father is a citizen…” 
(Bahamas Independence Order, 1973, art. 8). 
Clearly, the constitutional entitlement speaks 
to the newborn, the Bahamian parent’s sex—
and marital status—and the conditions under 
which the child gains this entitlement, or is 
denied it. The debate about the bills should 
therefore also include children’s rights. 
Another approach would be to broaden the 
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proposals themselves, and heed the advice 
given by the McWeeney Commission to 
remove all the disqualifiers contained in 
article 8 of the Constitution, thus making all 
Bahamian citizens and their children equally 
Bahamian. Nottage has stated that it was 
necessary to exclude some citizens from 
passing on citizenship to their children to 
ensure “attachment to the territory and 
allegiance to the state” (R. Nottage, personal 
communication, September 25, 2014). 
However, using a person’s place of birth, a 
singular moment in life, as the sole criterion 
to determine this concept is arbitrary and 
ineffective. Furthermore, demanding citizens’ 
“attachment to the territory and allegiance to 
the state” could be viewed as a colonial legacy 
which continues to define the persons who 
inhabit the territory as subjects. If, as has been 
stated, the aim of the constitutional reform 
exercise is to deepen our democracy (Gilbert, 
2013), then it could be argued instead that the 
state owes allegiance to the citizens, who are 
the true sovereigns. If a degree of loyalty or 
attachment is to be expected of a citizen, 
perhaps it ought to be to the society of fellow 
citizens around them, but such surely is not 
miraculously instilled in the newborn at the 
time—and by the place—of birth, that 
singular moment in life. 
CONCLUSION 
After scrutinizing both the 2002 and 2014 
proposals for constitutional reform, we see 
that, despite the removal of some barriers, 
Bahamian-ness continues to be treated as an 
exclusive good. These exclusionary qualities 
of Bahamian citizenship fail to foster 
democratic maturity, and encourage the 
disengagement and retreat into parallel 
societies of would-be citizens. As Bertin 
Louis has shown for Haitian-Bahamians, the 
state thus “produces subjects that are … 
unpatriotic and potentially disloyal to The 
Bahamas…” (2011, p. 20). However, as I 
have demonstrated, individuals that are 
potentially being excluded and alienated are 
more diverse and can include the progeny of 
families without any recent immigration 
background. 
Therefore, we must ask: Why is Christie, why 
are we, The Bahamas, attempting to change 
our Constitution to enshrine gender equality? 
And, why is this seemingly such a difficult 
task, with failure a distinct possibility? 
Some observers have opined that Christie’s 
second term in office will be about 
constructing his personal legacy (Dames, 
2014). He himself has used this term on 
occasion (“Crime Solving,” 2014; Christie, 
2015). However, legacy aside, other factors 
necessitate the appearance of movement 
towards constitutional reform for gender 
equality. 
In 1993, The Bahamas ratified the United 
Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW). Since then, The Bahamas has 
been unable to fully comply with the 
document because of its constitutionally 
enshrined gender inequality, and the 
Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women has repeatedly 
demanded constitutional and legislative 
improvements to fully implement the 
Convention in The Bahamas, e.g. in 2012 it 
recommended that the government: 
take steps to repeal article 26(1) of the 
Constitution and ensure that an explicit 
definition of discrimination in line with 
article 1 of the Convention, as well as 
provisions on the equal rights of women 
in line with article 2(a) of the 
Convention, be included in the 
Constitution or in other appropriate 
legislation (p. 3). 
or that The Bahamas “amend its Constitution 
and relevant domestic laws to grant Bahamian 
women equal rights with men regarding the 
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transmission of their nationality to their 
children or to their spouses of foreign 
nationality” (p. 7). 
Not only as a party to CEDAW, but as a 
nation heavily dependent on tourism—and 
tourism targeting a predominantly Western, 
North American customer base—The 
Bahamas is caught between legal spaces on 
this issue. At least the appearance of 
movement towards equal rights is important 
to avoid potential negative consequences. 
Compliance issues with CEDAW can also 
explain the narrow focus on gender in the 
proposals to change the citizenship 
provisions, rather than an overall reform of 
the system to create a more inclusive 
Bahamas in general. 
On the other hand, as we have seen, there 
seems to be only a limited commitment of 
government resources towards educating the 
electorate on, and convincing them of the 
benefits of such a constitutional change. 
While on the one hand The Bahamas needs to 
comply with international treaties and 
domestic laws, on the other hand there are 
socially widely accepted rules and 
conventions that may not necessarily accept 
women as equal to men. As has been shown 
in the marital rape debate, certain religious 
interpretations can negatively influence public 
attitudes in this arena (Benjamin & LeGrand, 
2012, p. 29). Furthermore, many Bahamians 
interpret the call in the Constitution’s 
preamble for “an abiding respect for Christian 
values” (Bahamas Independence Order, 1973, 
Preamble) “as a declaration that The Bahamas 
is a Christian nation” (Benjamin & LeGrand, 
2012, p. 29). 
The issue of legal spaces can be spun as a 
threat to Bahamian sovereignty, and the issue 
of multi-normativity makes constitutional 
reform towards gender equality a political 
minefield domestically. Many callers on talk 
radio vocally oppose the proposals, and hosts 
allow them considerable air-time. As 
Nicolette Bethel noted about the influence and 
power of talk radio, The Bahamas is “a 
country where radio talk show hosts 
determine the decisions taken by government 
officials and analytical texts are relegated to 
college classrooms or embattled conclaves of 
academics...” (Bethel, 2000, pp. 257-258). It 
is then not surprising that an administration 
beset by controversy, especially one that in 
hindsight is able to look at the political 
consequences of an earlier failed 
constitutional referendum, does not appear to 
see this referendum as a priority at present. 
Regardless of one’s stance on the subject of 
gender equality, observers have also noted 
amongst Bahamians a general reluctance to 
make any changes to the Constitution. This 
has been linked to the false belief amongst 
many Bahamians that our founding fathers 
crafted the Constitution as “an original work 
of Bahamian authorship” (Johnson, 2008, p. 
17) when in fact the document is merely the 
1973 vintage of “the Westminster Export 
Model Constitution,” (Johnson, 2008, p. 18) 
handed to us by the British at Independence. 
Perpetuating the exclusionary qualities of 
Bahamian citizenship encourages the 
disengagement and retreat into parallel 
societies of would-be citizens. This refusal of 
our society to be more inclusive is what 
Alfred Sears predicted could become “a threat 
to the domestic stability of The Bahamas” 
(1994, p. 10). 
Constitutional reform is a vital ingredient in 
shaping a more progressive future; however, 
in The Bahamas, as in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean in general, “the discourse on 
constitutional reform is fundamentally sterile 
and technocratic and not tied to any 
philosophical direction” (Barrow-Giles, 2010, 
pp. 7-8). The challenge is to shift this 
paradigm and to challenge these inherited 
notions. Failure to do so means accepting the 
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shackles of coloniality. 
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